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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes an extension of GSA, a 
knowledge based expert system designed to help 
nonexperts perform generic safety analysis. GSA is 
implemented on the E M Y C I N  expert system shell, 
consists of approximately 150 safety related rules, 
and runs on a VAX  11-750 computer. As originally 
implemented, GSA organized several generic safety 
problems within a well-structured tree and focused 
on problems within interface biomechanics. GSA 
also emphasized the application of theoretical princi- 
ples instead of empirical data. To extend GSA, a 
specialized empirical knowledge base was developed 
that described the available slip resistance found for 
various combinations of surfaces, shoes, and con- 
taminants. During knowledge acquisition, it became 
apparent that fundamental problems were present in 
much of the past research regarding to available slip 
resistance. We therefore chose to directly collect 
data during a large controlled experiment. The col- 
lected data was initially organized by applying stat- 
istical methods. After the statistical results were 
classified into conceptually meaningful categories, a 
set of rules was easily described and added to the 
system. The conclusion was that GSA describes an 
extendable framework that can organize and selec- 
tively apply very specialized safety ergonomics re- 
search. 
INTRODUCTION 
The size, diversity, and disorganization of the 
data in safety and ergonomics often impedes its 
application. Designers or other nonexperts in 
safety or ergonomics may find it difficult to iso- 
late the small subset of relevant safety ergonomics 
data. More importantly, applying such data re- 
quires much synthesis of diverse principles, which 
is difficult even for safety practitioners highly 
familiar with safety (Johnson, 1980). 
Directly providing relevant safety ergonomics 
knowledge during computer aided design is a pos- 
sible solution to this problem. The need for 
sophisticated computer aided design methods has 
recently been been recognized by human factors 
experts (Askren, 1985; Coury, 1983). We propose 
that this need can often be satisfied by developing 
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expert systems similar to the traditional models 
used to organize knowledge in safety and ergo- 
nomics. 
This paper first addresses the use of traditional 
safety models to define a generic model that (1) 
organizes safety knowledge, and (2) is compatible 
with the knowledge representations used in expert 
systems. A description is given of GSA, an expert 
system equivalent to this model. An extension of 
GSA is then described, showing how detailed 
knowledge can be developed and added. An exam- 
ple illustrating use of the system is also given. 
BACKGROUND 
A subset of AI based computer programs, called 
expert systems, solves complex problems previ- 
ously assumed to require human expertise (Stefik 
et al., 1982). Such programs emphasize the sep- 
aration of a simple control structure from a highly 
structured knowledge base, thereby allowing the 
knowledge to be applied in flexible problem 
specific ways. For safety and/or ergonomics ap- 
plications, such flexibility is attractive because a 
large knowledge base containing unorganized re- 
search findings and a few generic principles must 
somehow be distilled and applied to specific prob- 
lems. 
Development of CAD/expert systems 
Expert systems require well-structured knowl- 
edge bases that are designed to be efficiently 
accessed, usually by simple search. Such knowl- 
edge bases partition complex problems into smaller 
subproblems and often are organized by hierar- 
chies or other simple models that describe rela- 
tionships between subproblems (Simon, 1969). 
The development of well-structured knowledge 
bases is a labor-intensive process. Given that 
organized safety and ergonomics knowledge cur- 
rently exists, even in partial form, much of this 
development work could be avoided (Lehto et al., 
1984). 
Validation and maintenance of CAD/  
expert systems 
Validation and maintenance have been rela- 
tively neglected issues in expert systems research. 
The techniques of systems analysis developed over 
years of information system design have not been 
adequately considered (Martins, 1984). Such ne- 
glect has resulted in costly systems that are dif- 
ficult to maintain because of their complexity. The 
inherent difficulty of scientifically validating sys- 
tems based on intuitive, nonstructured, so-called 
"expert knowledge", also poses a problem. 
If expert systems in safety or ergonomics are 
carefully designed, both the maintenance and 
validation issues may become of less concern. 
Given that an underlying model cleanly partition 
the problems to be solved, it should be relatively 
easy to add new information to the system. In the 
most desirable case, the model would also organize 
carefully obtained "scientific" knowledge, making 
validation less difficult. Traditional methods of 
organizing safety and ergonomics knowledge can 
aid in attaining both objectives. 
Safety ergonomics knowledge structure 
Existing safety ergonomics knowledge is 
organized within accident models, safety stan- 
dards, safety literature, accident statistics, and hu- 
man experts. Importantly, both descriptive and 
empirical accident models correspond closely to 
knowledge structures commonly used by expert 
systems (Lehto, et al., 1984). 
Descriptive accident models 
Descriptive accident models organize safety 
knowledge. For example, the "energy countermea- 
sures" model (Haddon, 1973) generically describes 
accident types, causes, and countermeasures. 
"Cause tree analysis" (Driessen, 1970) clarifies the 
relationship between multicausation and the acci- 
dent sequence, and has been used to integrate high 
level principles found within the safety literature 
(Johnson, 1975). Other models describe important 
concepts such as sequential steps in decision-mak- 
ing (Ramsey, 1976; Surry, 1968), task analysis 
(Drury and Brill, 1983), and influences of person- 
ality factors (Taylor, 1976). 
Empirical accident models 
A smaller sub-set of accident models contain 
detailed knowledge applicable to specific safety 
problems. These models are empirically derived, 
and emphasize simple mathematical relations. Ex- 
amples are biomechanical (Chaffin et al., 1977), 
psycho-physiological (Mital, 1983), and material 
handling models (Coury, 1983). 
Combining descriptive and empirical models 
Both descriptive and empirical accident models 
structure safety ergonomics knowledge, but tend 
to either, (1) be so general that application to 
specific problems requires professional expertise, 
or (2) be so specific that many potential sources of 
knowledge and problem areas are completely ne- 
glected. Ideally, combining general and specific 
accident models within some larger knowledge 
structure would eliminate these problems. 
The Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
(MORT) (Johnson, 1975; 1980) is an illustrative 
initial attempt at synthesizing safety principles in 
this way. There is a need for more effort along 
these lines because, in many areas of safety and 
ergonomics, both the knowledge and research is 
poorly organized (Lehto and Miller, 1986). 
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF 
GSA 
GSA was not intended to immediately repre- 
sent the most advanced empirical knowledge in 
safety and ergonomics. It was instead intended to 
be a skeletal framework to which new information 
could be incrementally added, eventually leading 
to a system that could be called expert in certain 
areas. The theory was that descriptive accident 
models could be used to define the gross structure 
of GSA and that this gross structure would both 
guide the application of specific principles and be 
easily extendable. 
The high-level knowledge base 
The knowledge base in GSA is defined by a 
model which has a meaningful form of abstraction 
at several different levels (Figs. 1-3). Each level 
corresponds to several subproblems which become 
more specific at lower levels. The production rules 
within the system are organized in accordance 
with this model. This results in a hierarchy of rules 
where general or "metalevel" rules define the 
overall problem solving strategy of the system, 
while more detailed rules develop specific conclu- 
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Fig. 1. The abstracted problem tree. 
sions. Seventeen rules are used to specify this 
overall problem solving strategy. 
At the top level (Fig. 1), two very general 
subproblems within safety analysis are dis- 
tinguished. One is generic hazard analysis, the 
other is safety standards analysis. Within safety 
standards analysis, the immediate subproblem is 
to determine which standards are relevant. The 
system, as originally implemented, contained seven 
rules capable of selecting relevant standards for 
striking tools. Also defined, but not further 
analysed, were the subproblems pertaining to use 
related compliance, materials compliance, tested 
compliance, and manufacturing compliance. 
Within general hazard analysis, one subprob- 
lem is to ~valuate the hazards associated with 
hazardous/toxic materials. Other obvious sub- 
problems are described by Haddon's (1973) en- 
ergy model, which distinguishes between the 
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Fig. 3. The relation of specific danger causes to the product 
specific diagnosis. 
mechanical energy transfer. Each subproblem has 
an associated form of generic hazard analysis 
which again can be described with a set of sub- 
problems. RULE006 in Table 1 shows how the 
subproblems at this level are organized by a single 
rule. 
The focused knowledge base 
The focus in GSA in on safety problems within 
interface biomechanics, a subset of those involving 
the transfer of mechanical energy. Interface bio- 
mechanics is specifically concerned with the mech- 
anical interface between the human and physical 
objects. Example tasks involving interface bio- 
mechanics include walking, lifting, carrying, grip- 
ping, striking, and so on. 
Safety problems in interface biomechanics can 
be separated into those which involve impact 
and/or  the application of force. Figure 2 il- 
lustrates the general subproblems described by 
GSA that fall within impact and/or force related 
hazard analysis. These problems and the sequence 
they are performed in are: (1) define general 
hazards, (2) define general countermeasures, and 
(3) develop a product specific diagnosis. Thirty- 
three rules are used to determine the general 
hazards and countermeasures. Seventy rules are 
used to develop and display product specific diag- 
noses. 
General hazard definition 
General hazards are defined in GSA by first 
determining the generic danger, then the generic 
causes of the generic danger, and finally the 
TABLE 1 












Oeneric-hazards-analysed = yes (1.0), and 
Display generic-hazards-analysed 
RULE029 
If: (1) Force-applied-by-human-when-applying-impact is 
traced, 
(2) Human-arm-length is traced, and 
(3) Inertia-at-shoulder is traced 
Then:Angular-acceleration-at-product-head = force-applied- 
by-human-when-applying-impact * human-arm-length/ 
inertia-at-shoulder 
specific causes of the generic danger. The hazard 
definition within GSA becomes progressively more 
detailed as this sequence of activity nears comple- 
tion. 
To describe the generic danger, the first sub- 
problem is to selectivity assign to the analysed 
product the basic properties of striking, prying, or 
portability. These properties reflect the initial em- 
phasis on developing a knowledge base for 
handtools. More importantly, they correspond to 
basic product functions which can be easily re- 
lated to generic dangers, the second subproblem. 
For example, when analysing striking tools, a 
generic danger is "the transfer of kinetic energy to 
the human". For prying tools a generic danger is 
"the buildup and rapid transfer of potential en- 
ergy to the human". For portable products a 
generic danger is "an excessive or stressful ap- 
plication of force by the human", as in lifting. 
For each generic danger, there is a generic 
cause that can be further broken down into specific 
causes, For example, if the generic danger is "the 
transfer of kinetic energy to the human", a generic 
cause is "the breakage of important connections 
within or between the human and product". 
Several more specific causes then define which 
important connections can be broken in terms of 
task and product specific leverage, radial, tangen- 
tial, and connect forces. The connections are de- 
scribed by the possible interfaces between and 
within the human and product (hand to handle, 
foot to ground, prying surface to target object, 
and so on). The forces are described by the basic 
product function. For example, striking will in- 
volve radial, tangential, and connecting forces and 
prying will involve leverage and connecting forces. 
Seventeen rules are used to describe this gen- 
eral relationship between generic danger, generic 
causes, and specific causes, as function of basic 
product functions. 
General countermeasure definition 
Each general countermeasure is the inverse of 
particular generic and specific causes. Counter- 
measures to the danger caused by broken connec- 
tions include increasing the connection forces and 
reducing the radial, tangential and leverage forces. 
Countermeasures to force application related stress 
are to reduce the required force and to increase 
the acceptable force. Countermeasures to contact 
with sharp points or edges include designing out 
sharp points and edges, designing guards which 
cannot be removed, using materials which do not 
form sharp points or edges after shattering, and so 
o n .  
Sixteen rules described the relationship be- 
tween general countermeasures and causes. 
Product specific diagnoses 
The specific causes of danger described above 
are hypothetical problems for an analysed prod- 
uct, because they are entirely developed by apply- 
ing general principles. The product specific diag- 
nosis therefore involves the analysis of each 
specific cause found to be relevant during the 
generic analysis (Fig. 3). Certain specific causes 
are relevant for more than one product function 
(gripping force greater than recommended), others 
are unique (impact creates sharp points and edges). 
The analysis mainly consists of estimating and 
then comparing the forces described within each 
relevant specific cause, for each applicable prod- 
uct function. If a disconnection force is found to 
exceed the opposing connection force, the specific 
cause is no longer hypothetical and a safety prob- 
lem has been uncovered for the product. Exerted 
forces are also compared to allowable limits. For 
example, one very general limit is a 50 lb lifting 
force when the product is portable and the subject 
is a male (based on Snook (1978) and the implica- 
tion that portable products will occasionally be 
65 
moved--other more specific limits based on 
NIOSH (1980) are also derivable). 
Connecting and disconnecting forces are calcu- 
lated using values of product-, user-, and environ- 
ment-specific factors that are obtained from the 
system's user. At this level, the knowledge base is 
consequently organized in terms of the parameters 
needed to calculate particular forces. For example, 
in order to calculate the gripping force required 
during a prying task, coefficients of friction, lever 
arms, and applied forces must be determined. 
Determining values for each of these parameters 
requires that other parameters be determined, and 
SO o n .  
The majority of rules relate such parameters to 
the hypothetical causes of safety problems (i.e. 
RULE029 in Table 1). Table 2 organizes parame- 
ters used in the initial version of GSA. Unfor- 
tunately, space constraints make it impossible to 
provide a detailed description. 
THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GSA 
The GSA initially consisted of a knowledge 
base of 127 rules and was implemented on a VAX 
11-750 computer using the EMYCIN computer 
program (Van Melle, 1980). The system performed 
generic safety analysis in the area of interface 
biomechanics and focused on handtool safety 
(Lehto, 1985). It also had a very general, but 
essentially undeveloped capability to perform 
generic safety analysis in other areas (Fig. 1). 
Certain characteristics of the resultant system 
are particularly interesting. Two such characteris- 
tics discussed below include, (1) meaningful levels 
of abstraction, and (2) sophisticated user-system 
interaction. A session with the extended version of 
GSA is discussed later (Table 10). 
Meaningful levels of abstraction 
GSA completes a generic analysis, before at- 
tempting a product specific diagnosis. GSA is 
unique, when compared to other AI applications, 
because the solutions obtained at each level are 
meaningful and of value. Table 3 summarizes 
selected generic outputs obtained during the anal- 
ysis of a clawhammer. Note that the generic out- 
puts are similar to the points given in general 
66 
TABLE 2 
Parameters considered in product specific diagnoses 
Apply impact related Apply force related 
1. Gripping force analysis 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. handle length 
3. handle materinl 
4. handle COF 
b. Effects of environment 
1. handle contaminents 
c. Effects of user 
1. Expected grip strength 
2. Skin COF 
2. Lifting force analysis 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. product dimensions 
3. handle dimensions 
b. Effect of user 
1. sex 
3. Flying objects analysis 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. handle length 
3. handle COF 
4. head material 
5. heat /handle connection strength 
6. head hardness 
7. handle shear strength 
b. Effects of environment 
1. target object hardness 
c. Effects of task 
1. forces applied 
2. angular and linear velocities 
3. radial disconnect force between head and handle 
d. User effects 
1. weight of arm links 
2. grip strength 
3. force applied 
1. Gripping force analysis 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. handle length 
3. handle material 
4. handle COF 
b. Effects of environment 
1. handle contaminents 
c. Effects of user 
1. Expected grip strength 
2. Skin COF 
2. Lifting force analysis 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. product dimensions 
3. handle dimensions 
b. Effects of user 
1. sex 
3. Push/pull  force analysis 
(Prying task) 
a. Effects of product 
1. product weight 
2. handle length 
3. handle COF 
4. head material 
5. head/handle  connection strength 
6. prying surface strength 
7. handle shear strength 
b. Effects of environment 
1. target-earth connection strength 
c. Effects of task 
1. forces applied 
2. resultant leverage 
3. tangential shear force between head and handle 
d. User effects 
1. grip strength 
2. force applied 
safety texts, and might remind a designer of obvi- 
ous, but easily forgotten principles. 
Table 4 presents part of the diagnosis for a 
particular claw-hammer. During the dialogue (user 
responses follow double asterisks), knowledge re- 
garding the effects of a common environmental 
contaminant (water) is considered by GSA when 
calculating a coefficient of friction (COF) between 
the hammer's handle and the human's hand. Given 
this COF value and other task related informa- 
tion, GSA determines that a potential hazard is 
present. Specifically, GSA concludes that "it is 
foreseeable that a larger than recommended 40 lb 
gripping force will be required while applying 
impact with this particular hammer". The system 
then moves on to evaluate other diagnoses. 
Sophisticated user-system interaction 
Many aspects of GSA are likely to aid user-sys- 
tem interaction. These include, (1) sophisticated 
explanation facilities, (2) structured query di- 
alogue, (3) multiple lines of reasoning, and (4) 
tolerance of user uncertainty. 
TABLE 3 
Selected generic outputs obtained during safety analysis of a 
claw hammer 
Generic causes for apply impact related danger for the hammer  
are as follows: 
FORCE-APPLICATION-TOO-LARGE 
STRIKING-FACE-MISSES-TARGET 
I M P O R T A N T - P R O D U C T - C O N N E C T I O N S - A R E -  
BROKEN 
P R O D U C T - U S E - C R E A T E S - U N G U A R D E D - S H A R P -  
POINTS-OR-EDGES 
Generic countermeasures for the generic dangers associated 
with applying impact with hammer  are as follows: 
R E D U C E - F O R C E - A P P L I E D - B Y - H U M A N  
P R E V E N T - H U M A N - F R O M - C O N T A C T I N G - S H A R P -  
POINTS-OR-EDGES-BY-GUARDING 
MODIFY-PRODUCT-TO-INCREASE-EASE-OF-  
H I T T I N G - T A R G E T  
MODIFY-PRODUCT-T O- INC R E AS E -HE AD-  
H A N D L E - C O N N E C T - F O R C E  
M O D I F Y - P R O D U C T - T O - R E D U C E - C H A N C E - O F -  
CHIPPING 
Sophisticated explanation facilities 
One of the more interesting facilities of GSA is 
its ability to explain "why" and "how" certain 
conclusions are made. Such outputs are a direct 
consequence of the model underlying GSA and 
TABLE 4 
Outputs  obtained during the diagnosis of a special safety 
problem for a claw hammer  
(15) Is WOOD the material from which the hammer ' s  handle is 
composed? 
* * YES 
(16) Is OIL one of the foreseeable materials in the environment 
the hammer is used within? 
** NO 
(17) Is WATER one of the foreseeable materials in the 
environment the hammer  is used within? 
* * YES 
The coefficient of friction between hand and hammer ' s  handle 
is as follows: 0.25 
A specific safety problem for the hammer  is as follows: 
THE-FORESEEABLE-REQUIRED-GRIP-FORCE-FOR-  
T H E - P R O D U C T - I S - L A R G E R - T H A N - R E C O M M E N  DED 
The foreseeable required gripping force exerted by the human  




Example application of the WHY command 
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(17) What  is the Rockwell-C hardness value of the hammer ' s  
face? 
* * WHY 
[i.e. WHY is it important to determine the Rockwell hardness 
of the PRODUCT-2  face?] 
[1.0] This will aid in determining special apply-impact related 
safety problems for PRODUCT-2,  
It has already been established that 
[1.1] apply-impact is one of the generic designed func- 
tions of the hammer,  and 
[1.2] tangential-force-gt-connect-force is one of the 
specific reasons important product connections may 
be broken for the hammer  during impact applica- 
tion 
Therefore, if 
[1.3] the Rockwell hardness of the hammer  head is less 
than or equal to foreseeable hardness value on the 
Rockwell C scale of target objects 
then 
(1) It is definite (1.0) that hitting-hard-objects- 
with-hammer-will-cause-flying-chips is one of 
the special apply-impact related safety problems 
for the hammer. 
Author: MRL 
[RULE0331 
the ability of the EMYCIN program to utilize this 
structure to create meaningful explanations. Of 
interest is that these explanations are given in 
English rather than cryptic code. 
These abilities are partially demonstrated in 
Table 5. For that exchange the user's query of why 
GSA requires information concerning the Rock- 
well hardness of the hammer's head is answered 
by stating "this will aid in determining special 
apply-impact related safety problems". GSA then 
states what it already knows to be true about the 
particular problem and explains that if the 
Rockwell hardness of the hammer's head is less 
than the Rockwell hardness of the struck object, 
flying chips are a special apply-impact related 
safety problem for the hammer. 
Another generic query allows the user to ask 
how GSA developed certain conclusions. Refer- 
ring back to the previous example, if the user asks 
how it was determined that apply-impact was a 
designed product function, GSA explains "a  de- 
signed function is apply-impact because the prod- 
uct's name is hammer". To an additional how 
68 
TABLE 6 
An example expanded query given by GSA 
(12) Do you wish to input an estimate of the force the human  exerts upon the handle of the hammer  when applying impact? If you 
are unsure type return information? 
** R E T U R N  I N F O R M A T I O N  
This force estimate is used by the program to estimate the maximum linear velocity of the head of the hammer.  If a value is not given, 
the program will not be able to calculate this velocity and will instead ask you for an estimated max imum linear velocity. 
query, GSA answers "you said the product's name 
is hammer". 
GSA is also able to provide extensive back- 
ground information regarding certain questions it 
asks of the user. Table 6 documents such an 
exchange. In another similar example, GSA ex- 
plains to the user that the weight and length of a 
human's arm are needed in order to calculate the 
forces exerted while applying impact with a 
handtool and also explains its ability to provide 
default values. 
Structured query dialogue 
GSA queries the user for particular facts when 
they are needed to solve a specific subproblem. 
Once GSA can tell from a user answer that a 
particular reasoning chain is a dead end, or that 
the problem is solved, it backs up to a higher level 
subproblem. The questions follow a logical pat- 
tern, because the reasoning chains are explicitly 
defined by the underlying model which organizes 
the subproblems. 
Multiple lines of reasoning 
Often GSA is able to reach a conclusion in 
more than one way. For example, when calculat- 
ing the tangential forces exerted while applying 
impact, the system can obtain the same answer 
from either an estimate of the applied force or the 
maximum angular velocity. GSA can directly ask 
the user for the values of such parameters and also 
has the ability to estimate values if the user is 
unable or unwilling to provide them. The earlier 
example (Table 4) illustrates this flexibility, as the 
user could have simply given GSA the value for 
COF. 
Tolerance of user uncertainty 
GSA is also able to accept user responses of 
arbitrary certainty because of the built in capabili- 
ties of EMYCIN (Van Melle, 1980). Any response 
by the user can have an associated certainty factor 
ranging from - 1  to 1. A minus one indicates the 
user is sure the response is untrue while a one 
indicates the user is sure the response is true. A 
zero, on the other hand, indicates complete uncer- 
tainty. The uncertainty in responses is propagated 
throughout the developed conclusions by EMY- 
CIN (see Shortliffe and Buchanan, 1984). 
Returning to the example given in Table 4, the 
user could have included a certainty value of 0.5 
with the answer WOOD to the question regarding 
the handle material. This would cause GSA to also 
ask if STEEL or RUBBER was the handle 
material. Affirmative answers, with certainty of 
0.5, to these latter questions would result in the 
calculation of three COF values, each with a cer- 
tainty of 0.5. An affirmative answer, with a cer- 
tainty of 1 for any of these materials would result 
in a single COF estimate with certainty of 1. 
EXTENSION OF THE GSA 
Several significant safety problems within inter- 
face biomechanics were not originally considered 
in the GSA. Among these problems, slips and falls 
posed an interesting opportunity to extend the 
system. Of interest was that empirical knowledge 
is especially applicable during the analysis of slips 
and falls. The area also was sufficiently different 
from handtool safety to allow maintenance issues 
to be evaluated. 
Scope of the extension 
One indicator of the potential of slips and falls 
is the available surface slip resistance, tradition- 
ally expressed as coefficient of friction (COF). In 
spite of the numerous studies that have evaluated 
surface slip resistance, little detailed information 
is available in a form easily applied by designers. 
This led us to conclude that an extended version 
of GSA would be of value to designers, given that 
it could accurately predict the available slip resis- 
tance in a variety of circumstances. We therefore 
addressed the potential of extending GSA so as to 
have specialized expert ability in this problem 
area. 
Knowledge acquisition 
It is well-known that the available surface slip 
resistance is infuenced by flooring surface materi- 
als and textures, shoe soles, and contaminants. 
Predicting the available slip coefficient as a func- 
tion of these qualitative factors is actually a clas- 
sification problem; a category of problems for 
which rule based expert systems are especially 
appropriate. 
As a first step in knowledge acquisition, an 
initial literature survey immediately revealed the 
difficulty of predicting surface slip resistance on 
the basis of the published literature. Fundamental 
problems were present, such as questionable test- 
ing methods and past failures to factorially in- 
vestigate the influence of variables. Because of 
these problems, we chose to collect data in a 
controlled experiment. This moderately reduced 
the scope of the problem and increased our confi- 
dence in the validity of the data upon which the 
system would depend. 
Data collection 
A complete factorial experiment was performed 
(for details see Miller, Lehto, and Rhodes, 1987) 
using a testing procedure similar to that recom- 
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mended in Federal Specification RR-G1602B 
(1984). The testing procedure consisted of first 
preparing sole samples (which were mounted upon 
a flat steel holder) to correspond to particular 
contaminant conditions. The samples were then 
placed upon the surface material and loaded with 
a 104 lb vertical weight. This loading level corre- 
sponded closely to the average vertical loading 
exerted by a person of average weight while mov- 
ing before a slip (Strandberg, 1983) and the sam- 
ple was approximately the size of the toe area of 
an average male's shoe. Approximately 10 s after 
the weight was placed on the sample, a pulling 
force was gradually applied to the holder in a 
direction either lateral or longitudinal to the in- 
tended orientation of the slip resistant material. 
The pulling force was continuously recorded as it 
increased. At the point where movement began, 
the pulling force was ceased and the peak level 
was recorded. 
The dependent variable was a static measure of 
the available surface slip resistance coefficient 
(ASRC), or simply the measured ratio of horizon- 
tal to vertical force at which movement occurs. 
The static ASRC appears to be a valid measure of 
slip potential, since at the start of a slip the 
velocity of the foot with respect to the floor surface 
is typically zero (Strandberg, 1983). The indepen- 
dent variables (Table 7) comprised seven different 
surfaces (six of which were described as being slip 
resistant by their manufacturers), four different 
sole materials, two different contaminants as well 
as no contaminants, and two orthogonal direc- 
tions of the applied force (in relation to the nor- 
mal orientation of the surface material). Five rep- 
licate measures were taken for each experimental 
condition. 
TABLE 7 
Independent variables considered during the experimental evaluation of the available slip resistance coefficient (ASRC) 
Surface-type Sole material Contaminants Force direction 
Slip resistant No. 1 
Slip resistant No. 2 
Slip resistant No. 3 
Slip resistant No. 4 
Slip resistent No. 5 
Slip resistant No. 6 
Smooth painted No. 7 
Crepe None Lateral 




Completion of the experiment resulted in table 
of 168 means. This factorial set of data described 
a large set of different walking or climbing 
scenarios. 
Statistical knowledge extraction 
Simply developing a set of 168 rules, where 
each rule defined the mean ASRC for a combina- 
tion of experimental conditions was one feasible 
approach to system development. An alternative 
approach was to extract the knowledge imbedded 
in this data base by statistical methods. Such an 
approach would theoretically result in the devel- 
opment of meaningful rules rather than a large set 
of redundant data. 
To evaluate the feasibility of the latter ap- 
proach, we first used analysis of variance to un- 
cover all significant main effects and interactions. 
The potential of predicting the ASRC was sup- 
ported by the ANOVA, since the nonsignificant 
effects and error term together only corresponded 
to 6% of the variance. To predict the ASRC the 
significant main effects and interactions were then 
recoded as indicator variables (Chatterjee and 
Price, 1977) during regression analysis. It should 
be emphasized that the indicator variables were 
developed by recoding orthogonal variables mea- 
sured in a complete factorial experiment. Conse- 
quently, the predictive weights of each indicator 
variable specified by the finally developed equa- 
tion (Table 8) are meaningful, which is not gener- 
ally the case in multiple regression analysis. 
The regression equation explained 89% of the 
variance in the obtained values for the ASRC. 
Each term was highly significant with a small 
standard error and the variance/covariance ma- 
trix did not indicate problems with multicollinear- 
ity. Since the equation accurately predicted the 
ASRC, a decision was made to use the knowledge 
imbedded within the equation rather than the 
entire set of means. 
T A B L E  8 
Summary of the regression equation used to predict the available slip resistance coefficient (ASRC)  
Factor Potent. Weight  Std. T-Stat  Signif. 
values error 
1. C O N S T A N T  (1) 
2. L E A T H E R - S O L E  (0, 1) 
3. C R E P E - S O L E  (0, 1) 
4. O I L - R E S I S T A N T - S O L E  (0, 1) 
5. W E T  x C R E P E - S O L E  (0, 1) 
6. DIESEL x R U B B E R - S O L E  (0, 1) 
7. S T E P - R I N G S  (0, 1) 
8. STEP-POINTS (0, 1) 
9. P A I N T E D - S T E P  × 
R U B B E R - S O L E  (0, 1) 
10. POINTS (NO E D G E S ) - S T E P  x 
C R E P E  or L E A T H E R - S O L E  (0, 1) 
11. S M O O T H - S T E P  × 
L E A T H E R - S O L E  x 
( N O T  W E T / W A T E R )  (0, 1) 
12. F O R C E - D I R  × 
S T E P - E D G E - D I R E C T I O N  ( - 1,0,  1) 
13. F O R C E - D I R  x 
S O L E - E D G E - D I R E C T I O N  × 
S T E P - E D G E - D I R E C T I O N  ( - 1, 0, 1) 
14. F O R C E - D I R E C T I O N  × 
S T E P - E D G E - D I R E C T I O N  x 
H A R D - R U B B E R - S O L E  ( - 1, 0, 1) 
15. F O R C E - D I R  × 
S T E P - R I N G - D I R E C T I O N  × 
L E A T H E R  or R I B B E D - S O L E  ( - 1, 0, 1) 
M U L T I P L E  R = 0.94 R S Q U A R E  = 0.89 
0.74 0.019 38.6 0.0000 
- 0.25 0.022 - 11.7 0.0000 
- 0.15 0.021 - 7.2 0.0000 
0.17 0.018 9.1 0.0000 
- 0.17 0.028 - 6.0 0.0000 
- 0.29 0.017 17.4 0.0000 
0.10 0.016 6.6 0.0000 
0.06 0.020 3.0 0.0030 
- 0.16 0.017 - 9.3 0.0000 
0.13 0.036 3.7 0.0003 
- 0.11 0.029 - 3.7 0.0003 
0.04 0.014 2.5 0.0123 
0.07 0.028 2.6 0.0101 
0.11 0.028 3.9 0.0002 
0.07 0.016 4.5 0.0000 
S.E. = 0.079 
Classification 
The meaning imbedded within the regression 
equation was difficult to discern because of the 
equation's complexity. It turns out, however, that 
the terms in the regression equation (Table 8) can 
be classified into three meaningful categories: sim- 
ple sole material factors (terms 2, 3, and 4), 
sole-surface interlocking factors (7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 
14, and 15), and sole-surface stick factors (5, 6, 9, 
and 11). Each of these categories are conceptually 
independent. Therefore, given appropriate weight- 
ing, the contribution of factors not considered in 
the original experiment could be included in cer- 
tain less quantitative forms of analysis. For exam- 
ple, interlocking effects due to other types of 
surface protrusions could be heuristically esti- 
mated instead of using the provided equations. 
All three categories can also be further broken 
down into meaningful and conceptually useful 
subcategories. Sole-surface interlocking factors 
were subdivided into sole-point interlocking (8 
and 10), sole-ring interlocking (7 and 15), and 
sole-edge interlocking (12, 13, and 14). Sole-sur- 
face stick factors were subdivided into 
rubber-surface interaction factors (5, 6, and 9) 
and leather-surface interaction factors (11). Sim- 




A set of 31 rules was developed, partitioned 
according to the meaningful categories and sub- 
categories described above. Table 9 presents three 
illustrative rules. RULE134 organizes the three 
categories of factors described above. The ASRC 
is simply a constant plus the sum of the SOLE- 
SURFACE-INTERLOCKING-FACTOR, SIM- 
PLE-SOLE-MATERIAL-FACTOR, and SOLE- 
SURFACE-STICK-FACTOR. Each of these fac- 
tors must, of course, be determined before the 
ASRC can be determined. RULE130 shows how 
the SOLE-SURFACE-INTERLOCKING-FAC- 
TOR is calculated for one particular set of data. A 
total of 12 rules fell into this category. RULE140 
shows how the RUBBER-SURFACE-INTERAC- 
TION-FACTOR is calculated for one combina- 
tion of materials, contaminants and surface types. 
A total of 7 rules fell into this category. The 
remaining rules and factors were organized analo- 
gously. 
Incorporation of the rules into GSA 
Extending GSA required only minor extensions 
of its underlying model, since slips and falls natu- 
rally fell within the apply impact subproblem. For 
the generic portion of the system, additional rules 
TABLE 9 
Example rules estimating the ASRC 
RULE134 
If: (1) SOLE-SURFACE-INTERLOCKING-FACTOR is traced, 
(2) SIMPLE-SOLE-MATERIAL-FACTOR is traced, and 
(3) SOLE-SURFACE-STICK-FACTOR is traced 
Then:(1) ASRC = SOLE-SURFACE-INTERLOCKING-FACTOR + SIMPLE-SOLE-MATERIAL-FACTOR + SOLE-SURFACE- 
STICK-FACTOR + 0.74 (1.0) 
RULE130 
If: (1) the material the involved person's shoe soles are composed of is LEATHER, 
(2) a characteristic describing the type of walking surface is PROTRUDING-RINGS,  and 
(3) one edge of the protruding rings is not higher than the other 
Then: it is definite (1.0) that the calculated value of the SOLE-SURFACE-INTERLOCKING-FACTOR is 0.1 
Source: Miller, Lehto, and Rhodes (1987). 
RULE140 
If: (1) the material the involved person's shoe soles are composed of is RUBBER 
(2) the contaminant present on the walking surface is DIESEL, and 
(3) a characteristic describing the type of walking surface is PAINTED 
Then: it is definite (1.0) that the calculated value of the RUBBER-SURFACE-INTERACTION-FACTOR is -0 .45 
Source: Miller, Lehto, and Rhodes (1987). 
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were added that related two new product func- 
tions of climbing and walking to the new specific 
danger cause of "required antislip force greater 
than available antislip force". Other very minor 
changes were also made. 
Since the human's weight conceptually cancels 
out during the comparison of required and availa- 
ble antislip force (the ratio of the two forces 
depends only on the slip coefficients), GSA per- 
forms the product specific diagnosis by comparing 
the required and available slip coefficients. The 
ASRC is estimated using the 31 rules described 
above, while the required slip coefficient is imple- 
mented as a parameter that can be inputted by the 
user. The default value is currently the conserva- 
tive value of 0.5 recommended in the OSHA 1910 
standard and other sources. An obvious extension 
at this stage would be to determine the required 
value, using force platform data, for various tasks. 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
Example scenario 
A fall resulting in injury has taken place in an 
industrial setting. The safety practitioner is con- 
cerned with determining whether the walking 
surface upon which the fall took place is unsafe. 
The practitioner knows or has access to informa- 
tion describing the surface, the type of shoe worn, 
and contaminants. 
Example session with GSA 
An interaction with GSA for the above scenario 
is presented in Table 10. GSA first asks for the 
name of the product and quickly produces generic 
outputs. From among these outputs, the specific 
cause of danger (the required antislip force is 
greater than the available antislip force) becomes 
the hypothesis the system seeks to confirm in the 
product specific diagnosis. 
The product specific diagnosis 
During the diagnosis, questions 4 and 5 are 
asked because the system needs to determine the 
required antislip coefficient. Analogously, ques- 
tions 6 through 12 are used in determining the 
ASRC. Of interest is the provision of two different 
answers with certainty less than 1 to question 11. 
Consequently, two possible values are calculated 
for the ASRC. 
The system is unable to find any special safety 
problems, because the calculated available slip 
coefficients are both greater than 0.5. At this 
point, the product specific diagnosis is completed. 
Of interest is that the system efficiently developed 
the conclusion with a minimal set of questions. 
TABLE 10 
An example session with GSA. 
(1) What  is the name of the PRODUCT-1 that you wish to analyse? 
* * SLIP-RESISTANT-SURFACE 
(2) Is analysis of impact related hazards for the slip-resistant surface desired? 
* * YES 
The generic hazards associated with applying impact for the slip-resistant surface have been determined. 
The generic hazards for the slip-resistant surface are as follows: 
F A L L I N G - H U M A N ' S - K I N E T I C - E N E R G Y  
F A L L I N G - H U M A N ' S - P O T E N T I A L - E N E R G Y  
The generic dangers for the slip-resistant surface are as follows: 
FALLING-HUMAN-CONTACTS-SLIP-RESISTANT-SURFACE 
F A L L I N G - H U M A N - C O N T A C T S - E N V I R O N M E N T A L - O B J E C T  
Generic causes of danger for the slip-resistance surface are as follows: 
IMPORTANT-CONNECTIONS-ARE-BROKEN 
Specific causes of danger are as follows: 
REQUIRED-ANTISLIP-FORCE-GT-AVAILABLE-ANTISLIP-FORCE 
Generic countermeasures are as follows: 
R E D U C E - M O V I N G - H U M A N ' S - K I N E T I C - E N E R G Y  
REDUCE-REQUIRED-ANTISLIP-FORCE 
INCREASE-AVAILABLE-ANTISLIP-FORCE 
TABLE 10 (continued) 
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(3) Do you wish to obtain a detailed diagnosis for the slip-resistant surface? 
* * YES 
(4) Do you desire to input a value for the required antislip coefficient of the slip-resistant surface? 
** R E T U R N  INFO 
The required antislip coefficient is needed in order to determine the safety of the surface. If you do not know what the value 
should be used for the required antislip coefficient, I will help you determine one. 
** NO 
(5) Does the OSHA 1910 standard apply to the environment the slip-resistant surface is used within? 
* * YES 
I have determined that a reasonable value for the required antislip coefficient is 0.5. 
(6) How do you desire to describe the slip-resistant surface? 
* * 9  
one of: GENERICALLY 
B Y - M A N U F A C T U R E R  
* * B Y - M A N U F A C T U R E R  
(7) Give the manufacturer 's  name. 
* * ?  
one of: GRIP-STRUT 
MORTION 
NONE-OF-THESE 
* * NONE-OF-THESE 
(8) Can the characteristics describing the type of slip-resistant surface be best described as S E R R A D E D  EDGES? 
**  NO 
(9) Can the characteristics describing the type of slip-resistant surface be best described as P R O T R U D I N G - R I N G S ?  
* * YES 
(10) Is one edge of the protruding rings higher than the other? 
* * YES 
(11) When walking or climbing on the surface, is the horizontal force at the interface between the shoe and the slip-resistant surface 
normally exerted in the direction going from the higher edge of the ring to the lower edge of the ring? 
**  YES (5) NO (5) 
(12) What  is the material the expected user 's shoe soles are composed of? 
* * ?  
one of: LEATHER 
RUBBER 
CREPE 
* * LEATHER 
The calculated values of the ASRC are as follows: 
0.66 (0.5) 
0.59 (0.5) 
I was enable to determine any special apply-impact related safety problems for the slip-resistant surface. 
(13) Is ELECTRICAL one of the foreseeable types of energy from the environment that may contact the slip-resistant surface? 
**  NO 
Analysis of electrical energy related hazards is not  relevant for the slip-resistant surface. 
The generic hazards are analysed. 
(14) Is analysis of the slip-resistant surface's compliance with standards desired? 
* * YES 
Safety related standards for the product are as follows: 
OSHA 1910 
Federal Specification RR-G1602B 
(15) List the s tandards which you wish to analyse for the slip-resistant surface. 
* * N O N E  




The system then turns to other general safety 
problems defined by the generic model underlying 
GSA. The analysis of electrical energy related 
safety problems was quickly terminated, because 
the user's answer to question 13 allowed GSA to 
determine that such analysis was irrelevant for the 
product. Thermal and toxic material analysis were 
screened out because of high level rules associated 
with the product type. 
In regard to safety standard's compliance GSA 
provides two relevant safety standards and then 
concludes the session. 
Discussion 
Many aspects of the interaction displayed in 
Table 10 have already been described. What should 
be emphasized is that the underlying model effi- 
ciently guided the problem solving process in a 
user friendly way. Additionally, the complexity of 
the underlying empirical knowledge became of 
little concern because the rules are design- 
ed so that it can not be applied inappropriately. 
Placing the data into GSA also makes it availa- 
ble during the analysis of other safety problems. 
For example, in prying tasks the force exerted by 
the human could conceivably cause a slip. The 
system currently ignores this problem, but could 
be easily extended along these lines. This latter 
point describes an important advantage of the 
rule-based program as opposed to a traditional 
program. 
Although a traditional user friendly program 
encoding a regression equation could easily be 
written, it would be difficult to quickly develop a 
large flexible problem solving system which flexi- 
bly applies the knowledge imbedded within the 
equation. Extending and/or modifying the tradi- 
tional program (to accomodate changes in current 
knowledge, for example), would typically be dif- 
ficult because the procedures which use the knowl- 
edge would also have to be modified. Of even 
greater difficulty in developing the traditional pro- 
gram would be the quick implementation of 
sophisticated user-system interaction, such as the 
explanation capability discussed earlier. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Of fundamental interest was that GSA effi- 
ciently incorporated new knowledge gathered using 
traditional experimental approaches. It can there- 
fore be concluded, for certain problems in safety 
and ergonomics, that knowledge bases suitable for 
application by an expert systems can be developed 
using traditional methodologies. The results also 
demonstrate that well structured knowledge bases, 
as exemplified by the model underlying GSA, are 
maintainable. 
The results also support the use of expert sys- 
tems as a user friendly way of increasing access to 
both general and specialized knowledge. 
As a final note, there are many easily imple- 
mented ways of further extending GSA. A general 
extension of this type would be to provide product 
specific recommendations along with the diagno- 
sis. More detailed extensions include adding sub- 
problems to those considered within interface bio- 
mechanics and increasing the empirical knowledge 
base, as in incorporating the ability to predict the 
required surface slip resistance values on the basis 
of force platform studies, and so on. The same can 
be said for safety problems involving the transfer 
of other forms of energy and for evaluating stan- 
dards compliance. Such extensions are now being 
considered. 
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